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SOVEREIGNTY AS A BAR TO ENFORCEMENT OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11,246 IN FEDERAL
CONTRACTS WITH NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES
VICKI J. LIMAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Native American tribes, as employers, are exempt from coverage by
federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment. I However, tribes'
contracts with the federal government and their subcontracts with prime
federal contractors contain antidiscrimination-in-employment clauses au-
thorized by Executive Order No. 11,2462 and others.3 These executive
orders apply to contractors and their first-tier subcontractors4 holding
aggregate contracts of $10,000 or more and prohibit discrimination on
the same bases covered by the antidiscrimination statutes from which
tribes are exempt. In addition, Executive Order No. 11,246 requires federal
contractors to take affirmative action to hire and promote racial and
ethnic minorities and women.5 The Order mandates that contractors who
have fifty or more employees and hold aggregate federal contracts valued
at $50,000 or more maintain written affirmative action plans for each
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A., M.A., University
of Illinois at Chicago; J.D., Northwestern University. I thank Pamela Hammers for her research
assistance. I also thank individuals from the Department of Labor and the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs for sharing knowledge of the executive order programs and candid opinions
on the subject; although we may disagree in result, their knowledge and insights helped shape my
thinking about this topic. Conclusions are, of course, my own.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1991), prohibits
discrimination in employment based on race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. It expressly
exempts tribal employers from coverage. Likewise, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990), which prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals otherwise
qualified for the job in question, expressly exempts tribes from coverage. The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1969, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1990), does not mention tribes but has beeninterpreted to exclude tribes from its coverage. EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir.
1989); EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993). Furthermore,
tribes may not be subject to the United States Constitution and any equal protection obligations
thereunder. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896) (holding the Cherokee Nation's powers are
not limited by an Amendment of the Constitution).
On the general subject of coverage of tribes by federal labor and employment laws, see VickiJ. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes:
Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIz. ST. L. J. 681 (1994).
2. 3 C.F.R. 406 (Supp. 1969). Executive Order No. 11,246 prohibits federal contractors and
subcontractors from discriminating on the bases of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
3. See, e.g., Executive Order No. 11,141, 29 Fed. Reg. 2477 (1964) (prohibiting federal contractors
and subcontractors from discriminating on the basis of age); Executive Order No. 11,758, 39 Fed.
Reg. 2075 (1974) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled and Vietnam-era veterans).
4. This means tribes would be subject to Executive Order No. 11,246 not only on their own
direct contracts, but on a federal contract in which they are merely a subcontractor. See infra text
accompanying notes 38-41.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
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of their facilities documenting their workforce composition, the available
labor market, their efforts at hiring and promoting individuals within
these categories, and their goals for correcting those areas within facilities
that "underutilize" individuals within the categories. 6 Failure to comply
with the terms of Executive Order No. 11,246 may result in debarment
and administrative proceedings or suit by the federal government against
the contractor to enforce the antidiscrimination clause on behalf of the
aggrieved individual(s) or the agency.7
The issue of whether Executive Order No. 11,246 applies to tribes
poses real and severe dilemmas for tribal governments. Under the pur-
ported authority of the Order, the Department of Labor (DOL) is currently
considering whether to formally investigate a number of discrimination
claims against Native American tribes under their contracts with the
federal government or subcontracts with prime government contractors.
In addition, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP),
a subagency of the DOL, recently audited Cherokee Nation Industries,
a business wholly owned by the Cherokee Nation, for affirmative action
compliance under a contract the Nation holds with a prime defense
contractor. Potential administrative and defense costs, both in terms of
money and staffing, can easily overwhelm the majority of tribal gov-
ernments. On the other hand, tribes see no choice but to accede to these
federal requirements as a condition of receiving federal funding or business
income vital to the tribes' existence.
It has been simply assumed that tribes can be liable for employment
discrimination under the executive order programs even if they cannot
be liable for employment discrimination under federal statutes.8 For the
reasons explained below, this assumption is incorrect; government action
against tribal employers under the antidiscrimination executive order pro-
grams constitutes an unlawful intrusion into tribal sovereignty.
Part II presents the history and requirements of Executive Order No.
11,246. Part III discusses the unique status of tribes as sovereigns con-
tracting with the federal government, the law governing the federal/tribal
relationship, and the incidents of tribal sovereignty. Part IV then explains
why that law does not permit enforcement of Executive Order No. 11,246
against sovereign tribes. Part V proposes an alternative means of assuring
nondiscrimination in employment under federal contracts, consistent with
6. See infra text accompanying notes 51-61.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
8. See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 672 (1982 ed.):
[Tihe federal government enforces the Equal Employment Opportunity Act [Title
VII] as part of government contracts [citing Executive Order No. 11,246]. Although
tribes are not covered directly by that Act [citing Title VIII, they must observe it
in employment under government contracts [no citation]. The Act expressly excepts
hiring preferences for Indians on or near reservations [citing Title VII and 41
C.F.R. ch. 60 (regulations implementing Executive Order No. 11,246)]. The tribes
otherwise are bound by the Act in contract hiring [no citation].
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federal law, that accommodates the federal government's interest in both
nondiscrimination and tribal sovereignty. 9
II. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11,246
A. History of Executive Orders Prohibiting Discrimination in Federal
Contracts
Executive order programs targeting elimination of discrimination by
federal contractors resulted from vast disparities in employment oppor-
tunities for African Americans as opposed to whites.' 0 The first executive
orders requiring nondiscrimination in employment under federal contracts
were aimed at defense contractors' refusal to hire African Americans
during World War II. Executive Order No. 8802" was signed by Franklin
Roosevelt in 1941 to forestall a planned march on Washington sponsored
by the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and the NAACP to protest
racial discrimination by defense contractors.1 2 The order required all
9. This Article does not concern the current debate over the validity of affirmative action in
general. That debate rekindled after Adarand Constr. Co. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2101-02 (1995),
which held that federally sponsored programs using race-conscious criteria are subject to a strict
scrutiny standard of constitutionality. At issue were voluntary programs under the Surface Trans-
portation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132, and
the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996), under
which prime contractors would receive an enhanced contract amount if they subcontract at least
ten percent of their award with "small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103. Regulations under these
programs created a rebuttable presumption that minority-owned businesses were socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged. Id. Adarand overruled Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990), which had held that a racial classification designed to increase minority ownership of broadcast
stations was subject to a lesser standard. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101.
One commentator concludes that Adarand will have no effect on enforcement of Executive Order
No. 11,246:
Tailoring the use of goals and timetables to situations in which there is substantial
underrepresentation of women or minorities after taking legitimate qualifications
into account means that the requirement of goals and timetables is limited to
situations in which there is possible discrimination to remedy. The prevention of
ongoing discrimination is surely as compelling an interest as providing a remedy
for past discrimination, and an appropriately designed program should have little
difficulty meeting the requirements of Adarand ....
Richard T. Seymour, Affirmative Action: Update on the Legal Issues in Employment, Education,
and Contracting, ABA Sac. OF LABOR & EMPL. L., 1995 ANN. MEETING (Aug. 9, 1995).
For different reasons, Adarand will have no effect on programs benefitting Native Americans.
The United States Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel provides the following analysis:
Adarand does not require strict scrutiny review for programs benefitting Native
Americans as Inembers of federally recognized Indian tribes. In Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Supreme Court applied rational basis review to a hiring
preference in the Bureau of Indian Affairs for members of federally recognized
Indian tribes. The Court reasoned that a tribal classification is "political rather
than racial in nature," because it is "granted to Indians not as a discrete racial
group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities." Id. at 554.
U.S. Dep't of Just., Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum at 8 (June 28, 1995).
10. For a comprehensive history of the federal government's antidiscrimination initiatives and
the times that spawned them, see James E. Jones, Jr., The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative
Action in Employment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1985).
It. 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943).
12. See Jones supra note 10, at 905-06; OFCCP AND FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE, 4 n.26
(David A. Copus & Linda E. Rosenzweig, eds., 1981).
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federal defense contracts to contain a provision that the contractor would
not "discriminate in employment based on race, creed, color, or national
origin."' 3 The Preamble to Executive Order No. 8802 "asserted that full
manpower . . . utilization was the national goal and the exclusion of
blacks was a major barrier to the achievement of this goal."' 14 Two
subsequent executive orders signed by Roosevelt allowed this provision
to be incorporated by reference 5 (which is still the case under current
Executive Order No. 11,24616) and extended the nondiscrimination lan-
guage to all government contracts, labor unions representing workers on
such contracts, and the federal civil service.' 7 Despite the extension of
coverage, Executive Order No. 9346 was "by its terms directed toward
enhancing the pool of workers available for defense production."' 8
The executive orders issued during the Eisenhower administration con-
tinued the prohibitions on discrimination in all federal contracts, and
created a committee to hear complaints and make recommendations. 19
These changes, however, did little to integrate federal contractors' work-
forces .20
Against a backdrop of nationwide racial turmoil, the next major change
in content occurred in Executive Order No. 10,925,21 signed in 1963 by
President John F. Kennedy. President Kennedy's Order added to the
prohibitions on discrimination the requirement that the contractor "take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that em-
ployees are treated during their employment, without regard to their race,
creed, color, or national origin." ' 22 In the same year, Kennedy extended
the mandates of nondiscrimination and affirmative action to both federally
assisted construction contracts and to contracts directly with the federal
government .23
Executive Order No. 11,24624 was signed by Lyndon Johnson in 1965.
It expanded the scope of Kennedy's orders by requiring that all of the
contractor's operations maintain compliance with the Order during the
entire performance of the contract, not just those operations performing
the federal contract or receiving federal assistance. 25 Order No. 11,246
13. 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943).
14. Jones, supra note 10, at 907.
15. See Executive Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6,787 (1941).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
17. See Executive Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7,183 (1943). See also OFCCP AND FEDERAL
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE, supra note 12, at 5.
18. Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 169 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
19. See Executive Order No. 10479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953); Executive Order No. 10557, 3
C.F.R. 302 (1954-1958).
20. See OFCCP AND FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE, supra note 12, at 5-6; James L. Moeller,
Comment, Executive Order No. 11,246: Presidential Power to Regulate Employment Discrimination,
43 Mo. L. Rav. 451, 455 (1978).
21. 3 C.F.R. 488 (1959-1963).
22. Id.
23. See Executive Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963).
24. 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969).
25. Id. See also OFCCP AND FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE, supra note 12, at 7.
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also delegated its enforcement to the Secretary of Labor. 26 In 1967, "sex"
was added as a protected category to nondiscrimination and affirmative
action requirements, 27 and the word "religion" replaced the word "creed."' 2
Other executive orders added the following categories to be protected
from discrimination in federal contracting: age in 1964,29 veteran status
in 1974,30 and handicap in 1975.1' The Secretary of Labor has delegated
the administration and enforcement of executive order programs to the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), which has
promulgated extensive regulations under Executive Order No. 11,24632
and the other executive orders.3"
B. Requirements of Executive Order No. 11,246
The current version of Executive Order No. 11,246 consists of two
parts. Part I covered nondiscrimination in federal employment. It has
been superseded, however, by Executive Orders Nos. 11,37514 and 11,478. 5
Part II covers private contractors with the federal government and their
subcontractors; it incorporates an equal opportunity clause,36 both by
26. 3 C.F.R. 406.
27. See Executive Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969).
28. Id.
29. Executive Order No. 11,141, 29 Fed. Reg. 2477 (1964). This order prohibiting age discrim-
ination in federal contracting preceded the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. § 621 (1990), which was amended in 1972 to prohibit age discrimination in federal employment.
30. Executive Order No. 11,758, 39 Fed. Reg. 2075 (1974).
31. Executive Order No. 11,830, 40 Fed. Reg. 2411 (1975). See also The Rehabilitation Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
32. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60.1 through 60.60 (1994).
33. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-250.1 through 60-250.54 (1991) (veterans) and §§ 60-741.1 through 742.8
(1995) (handicap). Compliance with the regulations governing Executive Order No. 11,246 involves
greater efforts on the part of the contractor, particularly in terms of creating an affirmative action
plan, than does compliance with the regulations governing veterans' status and handicap. Therefore,
this discussion will focus on compliance with Executive Order No. 11,246, but the conclusion that
Executive Order No. 11,246 should not be applied to tribes is just as applicable to any executive
order concerning employment matters.
34. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
35. 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1969).
36. The equal opportunity clause is set out at section 202 of Executive Order No. 11,246, which
states:
Sec. 202. Except in contracts exempted in accordance with Section 204 of this
Order, all Government contracting agencies shall include in every Government
contract hereafter entered into the following provisions:
During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:
(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The contractor
will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that em-
ployees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the following:
employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment adver-
tising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and
selection for training, including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to post in
conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices
to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the provisions of this
nondiscrimination clause.
(2) The contractor will, in all solicitations or advertisements for employees placed
Spring 1996)
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reference3 7 and by mere operation of the Order itself,3" into all federal
contracts and subcontracts. Part III of the Order mandates application
of the equal opportunity clause in any construction contract that involves
federal assistance.3 9 Executive Order No. 11,246 is limited in application
to federal grants pertaining to construction contractsA0 Tribal contracts
or subcontracts may fall under either part of the Order'.
4
by or on behalf of the contractor, state that all qualified applicants will receive
consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
(3) The contractor will send to each labor union or representative of workers with
which he has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding,
a notice, to be provided by the agency contracting officer, advising the labor union
or workers' representative of the contractor's commitments under Section 202 of
Executive Order No. 11,246 of September 24, 1965, and shall post copies of the
notice in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment.
(4) The contractor will comply with all provisions of Executive Order No. 11,246
of September 24, 1965, and of the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the
Secretary of Labor.
(5) The contractor will furnish all information and reports required by Executive
Order No. 11,246 of September 24, 1965, and by the rules, regulations, and orders
of the Secretary of Labor, or pursuant thereto, and will permit access to his books,
records, and accounts by the contracting agency and the Secretary of Labor for
purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with such rules, regulations, and
orders.
(6) In the event of the contractor's noncompliance with the nondiscrimination
clauses of this contract or with any of such rules, regulations, or orders, this
contract may be canceled, terminated or suspended in whole or in part and the
contractor may be declared ineligible for further Government contracts in accordance
with procedures authorized in Executive Order No. 11,246 of September 24, 1965,
and such other sanctions may be imposed and the remedies invoked as provided
in Executive Order No. 11,246 of September 24, 1965, or by rule, regulation, or
order of the Secretary of Labor, or as otherwise provided by law.
(7) The contractor will include the provisions of paragraphs (1) through (7) in
every subcontract or purchase order unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders
of the Secretary of Labor issued pursuant to section 204 of Executive Order No.
11,246 of September 24, 1965, so that such provisions will be binding upon each
subcontractor or vendor. The contractor will take such action with respect to any
subcontract or purchase order as may be directed by the Secretary of Labor as a
means of enforcing such provisions including sanctions for noncompliance: Provided,
however, that in the event the contractor becomes involved in, or is threatened
with, litigation as a result of such direction, the contractor may request the United
States to enter into such litigation to protect the interests of the United States.
Executive Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
37. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4(d) (1995).
38. Id. § 60-1.4(e) which states:
By operation of the order, the equal opportunity clause shall be considered to be
a part of every contract and subcontract required by the order and the regulations
in this part to include such a clause whether or not it is physically incorporated
in such contracts and whether or not the contract between the agency and the
contractor is written.
39. Executive Order No. 11,246.
40. Id. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1991), prohibits discrimination
in federal grants on the bases of race, color, and national origin.
41. The general Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), 48 C.F.R. chs. 1-51 (1994), prescribe
that federal agencies incorporate the OFCCP's nondiscrimination regulations, including the equal
opportunity clause, into all contracts unless the contract has been exempted from those regulations
by the agency director. 48 C.F.R. ch. 1, §§ 22.8, 52.222.21-37. The OFCCP's Equal Opportunity
Clause appears in the FAR at 48 C.F.R. § 52.222.26. The FAR defines "contract" broadly at 48
[Vol. 26
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Compliance with the equal opportunity clause imposes a number of
obligations on the contractor and subcontractor. The Order itself states:
Each contractor having a contract containing the provisions prescribed
in Section 202 [the equal opportunity clause] shall file, and shall cause
each of his subcontractors to file, Compliance Reports with the con-
tracting agency or the Secretary of Labor as may be directed. Com-
pliance Reports shall be filed within such times and shall contain
such information as to the practices, policies, programs, and em-
ployment policies, programs, and employment statistics of the con-
tractor and each subcontractor, and shall be in such form, as the
Secretary of Labor may prescribe. 42
The OFCCP's regulations implementing this provision of the Executive
Order prescribe the following "Compliance Reports" of all contractors
with fifty or more employees that hold aggregate contracts amounting
to $50,000 or more, and of their first-tier 43 subcontractors: 4
1. EEO-1 Report. First, federal contractors must annually file Standard
Form 100, also called Form EEO-1, which provides a breakdown of the
workforce by race and sex. 45 The EEO-1 form must be filed with the
OFCCP within 30 days of the award of the contract unless the contractor
has filed the form within the 12 months preceding the award.4 The EEO-
1 form is also required by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), a subagency of the DOL that administers Title VII. 47
2. Affirmative Action Plan. In addition, federal contractors and sub-
contractors must prepare and maintain "a written affirmative action
compliance program" for each of their establishments, 48 commonly re-
ferred to as an "affirmative action plan," or "AAP." The regulations
describe the purpose of the AAP as follows:
C.F.R. § 2.101:
Contract means a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish
the supplies or services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for them. It
includes all types of commitments that obligate the Government to an expenditure
of appropriated funds and that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing. In
addition to bilateral instruments, contracts include (but are not limited to) awards
and notices of awards; job orders or task letters issued under basic ordering
agreements; letter contracts; orders, such as purchase orders, under which the contract
becomes effective by written acceptance or performance; and bilateral contract
modifications. Contracts do not include grants and cooperative agreements covered
by 31 U.S.C. 6301, et seq.
42. Executive Order No. 11,246.
43. Lower-level subcontractors may have to file this report as well if they meet certain require-
ments. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a) (1995).
44. In addition to the prescribed reports, OFCCP regulations require contractors and subcon-
tractors to certify to the contracting agency that they maintain nonsegregated work facilities, 41
C.F.R. § 60-1.8(b) (1995), and to post notices to employees and applicants of the employer's coverage
by the antidiscrimination provisions of Executive Order No. 11,246 and their rights to contact the
OFCCP if they believe they have been the subject of discrimination. Id. § 60-1.42.
45. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a)(1) (1995).
46. Id. § 60-1.7(a)(2).
47. Duplicate reporting to the EEOC is not required if the contractor has already submitted an
EEO-I report to the OFCCP or another agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d).
48. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1995).
Spring 19961
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
A necessary prerequisite to the development of a satisfactory affir-
mative action program is the identification and analysis of problem
areas inherent in minority employment and an evaluation of oppor-
tunities for utilization of minority group personnel. The contractor's
program shall provide in detail for specific steps to guarantee equal
employment opportunity keyed to the problems and needs of minority
groups, including, when there are deficiencies, the development of
specific goals and time tables for the prompt achievement of full and
equal employment opportunity.
4 9
Thus, the contractor must analyze the workforce at each of its estab-
lishments to determine whether "minority groups" (including women) are
being adequately "utilized" (i.e., are employed in representative numbers)
throughout the contractor's job classifications. In order to make this
determination, the contractor must first prepare a "table of job classi-
fications," including "job titles, principal duties (and auxiliary duties, if
any), rates of pay, and where more than one rate of pay applied (because
of length of time in the job or other factors), the applicable rates." 5 0
Next, the contractor must prepare a "utilization evaluation,"'" which
consists, first, of "[an analysis of minority group representation in all
job categories." '5 2 This analysis involves not only an internal analysis of
the establishment's workforce, but also an external analysis of the work-
force available in an appropriate recruiting area. The area from which
the contractor may expect to recruit depends upon the position being
analyzed. For example, an upper-management position might involve
nation-wide recruiting, whereas a clerical position might involve recruiting
from within a reasonable commuting distance. 3
The second step in the utilization evaluation is for the contractor to
analyze and document its "hiring practices for the past year, including
recruitment sources and [employment] testing."15 4 The contractor must
then analyze its "[job] upgrading, transfer and promotion" practices over
the past year. 5 Finally, it must prepare written "goals and timetables"
to document its intended efforts to redress- any "underutilization" of
minorities or women.
5 6
The AAP must be on file with the contractor within 120 days of the
start of the contract 7 and must be made available for inspection upon
request by the contractor's employees as well as by the DOL.5 9 The AAP
must be updated yearly.5 9 "[T]he contractor's affirmative action program
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 60-1.40(b).
52. Id.
53. Cf. Timken Co. v. Vaughn, 413 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
54. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(b)(2).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 60-2.12.
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and the result it produces shall be evaluated as part of compliance review
activities." 6
Commentators have pointed out (and the author can attest) that the
preparation and maintenance of an AAP imposes a "substantial admin-
istrative burden on employers." ' 6' "Employers must undertake costly,
time-consuming efforts to comply with the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Order." ' 62 In 1980, compliance with these provisions
of the OFCCP regulations cost Fortune 500 firms over $1 billion. 63 The
Under Secretary of Labor has acknowledged the monetary burden that
preparation of an AAP imposes on the contractor as well as the cost
to taxpayers for OFCCP review of the AAP. 64
Executive Order No. 11,246 allows the Secretary of Labor to exempt
certain contractors from some or all of the requirements of the Order. 65
The OFCCP has created by regulation an exception to the equal em-
ployment opportunity requirements of the Order with respect to em-
ployment of Native Americans by allowing contractors performing work
on or near a reservation to publicly announce and practice hiring pre-
ferences for Native Americans.66 Thus, such contractors, including tribes,
may, in essence, discriminate on the bases of race, color, and national
origin in their hiring practices. 67 According to the OFCCP regulation,
60. Id.
61. Moeller, supra note 20, at 465.
62. Richard C. Long, Comment, Remedying Discrimination in Seniority Systems: The Conflict
Between Title VII and Executive Order 11,246, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1101 (1981).
63. Edward C. Walterscheid, Back Pay as a Remedy Under Executive Order 11,246: A Study
in Administrative Activism, 18 PUB. CONT. L. J. 559, 584 (1989).
64. Malcolm R. Lovell, Jr., New Directions for OFCCP, 32 LABOR L. J. 763, 765 (1981). The
purpose of this article was to explain proposed changes to OFCCP regulations under the Reagan
administration. With regard to AAPs, the OFCCP "proposed to reduce this costly paperwork by
eliminating the annual report requirement for contractors with less than 250 employees and a contract
of under one million dollars." Id. This proposed change never occurred.
65. Executive Order No. 11,246:
The Secretary of Labor may, when he deems that special circumstances in the
national interest so require, exempt a contracting agency from the requirement of
including any or all of the provisions of Section 202 of this Order in any specific
contract, subcontract, or purchase order. The Secretary of Labor [may], by rule
or regulation, also exempt certain classes of contracts, subcontracts, or purchase
orders .... The Secretary of Labor may also provide, by rule, regulation, or
order, for the exemption of facilities of a contractor which are in all respects
separate and distinct from activities of the contractor related to the performance
of the contract ....
66. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(6) (1994):
Work on or near Indian reservations. It shall not be a violation of the equal
opportunity clause for a construction or nonconstruction contractor to extend a
publicly announced preference in employment to Indians living on or near an Indian
reservation in connection with employment opportunities on or near an Indian
reservation .... Contractors or subcontractors extending such a preference shall
not, however, discriminate among Indians on the basis of religion, sex, or tribal
affiliation, and the use of such a preference shall not excuse a contractor from
complying with the other requirements contained in this chapter.
67. Native American hiring preferences were held not to violate the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) ("The preference is not directed
towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; ihstead, it applies only to members of 'federally
recognized' Tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially classified as 'Indians.'
In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature."). See infra text accompanying
notes 181-86.
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however, those contractors may not discriminate on the bases of religion,
sex, or tribal affiliation.6 As will be discussed below, Congress has
recently expanded tribal preference rights even further with regard to
self-determination contracts by requiring contracting agencies to abide by
preference laws enacted by tribes; most tribal preference laws allow
discrimination on the basis of tribal affiliation.
69
C. Enforcement of Executive Order No. 11,246
Executive Order No. 11,246 directs the Secretary of Labor or the
federal contracting agency to implement the following sanctions against
contractors found not to be in compliance with the provisions of the
Order: publication of the names of noncomplying contractors; recom-
mendation to the Department of Justice to institute enforcement pro-
ceedings; recommendation to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to institute proceedings under Title VII; recommendation to
the Department of Justice to institute criminal proceedings for furnishing
false information; termination or suspension of the contract; and pro-
scription against entering into additional contracts.
70
Courts have uniformly held that Executive Order No. 11,246 does not
authorize private rights of action. 7' In its regulations implementing the
Order, however, the OFCCP expressly permits the government to seek
backpay as a remedy for individuals who have been found to be subjects
of discrimination.7 2 Commentators dispute the propriety of backpay awards
as a remedy for violation of the Order," but courts have generally accepted
backpay as an available remedy.7 4
D. Relationship of Executive Order No. 11,246 to Antidiscrimination
Statutes
The coverage of Executive Order No. 11,246 is coextensive with that
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196471 (Title VII). Title VII
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, national origin,
68. 41 C.F.R. §60-1.5(a)(6).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 199-218.
70. Executive Order No. 11,246.
71. See Walterscheid, supra note 63, at 577-78 n.96. See also OFCCP AND FEDERAL CONTRACT
COMPLIANCE, supra note 12, at 35-37.
72. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a)(2) (1995). However, the Order itself does not expressly authorize
backpay.
73. See OFCCP AND FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE, supra note 12, at 22-31; Walterschied,
supra note 63; Moeller, supra note 20, at 488-95. Compare Carmen G. Slominski & Hazel M.
Willacy, Back Pay and Extra-Judicial Proceedings: Is the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs Exceeding Its Authority?, 41 OHIO ST. L. J. 401 (1980) (arguing that Executive Order
No. 11,246 authorizes backpay recovery, but OFCCP's regulations concerning backpay are invalid)
with Karen Smith Bryan, Note, Recovery of Back Pay Under Executive Order 11,246, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 767 (1979).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 1976). For a criticism of the
reasoning of these cases, see Walterscheid, supra note 63, at 586-87.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991).
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sex, and religion.76 The content and terminology of Executive Order No.11,246 were amended to conform to that of Title VII. In 1967, "sex"
was added to the Order as a protected status, and the word "creed"
was replaced by "religion." ' 7 This was "apparently [done] to dispel anyquestion that results under the executive order should track the results
achieved under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ''T7 In addition,
Executive Order No. 11,246 provides that Title VII actions may be invoked
against contractors violating the equal opportunity provisions of the
Order.
79
While the overall validity of Executive Order No. 11,246 has been
debated by commentators,80 there remains little doubt that the Orderitself represents a valid exercise of presidential power. 8 For an executive
order to be valid, "[tihe President's power, if any, to issue the order
must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself." '8 2 However, the Executive has no constitutional power to "make"
law; the Constitution authorizes him to "execute" the law. 3 Therefore,
when issuing executive orders constitute "making" law, the Executive
must act under congressional authority. The Supreme Court, in its most
recent ruling on the validity of an executive order, stated that "it isdoubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls
... at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional
authorization to explicit congressional prohibition. ' 8 4
76. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
77. See OFCCP AND FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE, supra note 12, at 7.
78. Id.
79. Executive Order No. 11,246.
80. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979).
81. See cf. id.
82. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
83. See Walterschied, supra note 63, at 569. Mr. Walterscheid highlights two passages from
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. that underscore this point:
The language of the Constitution is not ambiguous or qualified. It places not somelegislative power in the Congress; Article I, Section 1 says "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ....-Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring));[Tihe President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea
that he is to be lawmaker. The Constitution itself limits his function in the lawmakingprocess to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he
thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall
make the laws which the President is to execute.
Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 587).
84. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669 (commenting on the three categories of executive action
set out in Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube). Courts and commentatorshave assessed the validity of Executive Order No. 11,246 under those three categories:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate ....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes ... enable, if not invite, measures on independent
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Some courts have concluded that the congressional authority for Ex-
ecutive Order No. 11,246 emanates from the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Act of 1949.85 Commentators note, however, that
the burdensome requirements of Executive Order No. 11,246 are incon-
sistent with the stated purpose of that Act, which is "to provide the
Government an economical and efficient system for ... procurement
and supply of personal property and nonpersonal services .... ,,86 These
commentators conclude that the authority given the Executive under the
procurement statute is not adequate to support the Order's requirements.87
A number of courts have concluded alternatively that Title VII provides
the congressional authority for Executive Order No. 11,246.88 Congress
recognized the existence of the executive order program in its initial
enactment of Title VII in 1964 by expressly exempting from Title VII's
recordkeeping requirements those employers maintaining similar records
under the executive order program.8 9 At the same time, Congress refused
to designate Title VII as the exclusive source of federal remedies for
employment discrimination. 9° In its consideration of the 1972 amendments
to Title VII, Congress more emphatically supported the executive order
program when it defeated an attempt to curtail Executive Order No.
11,246. A commentator describes these events:
[Diuring debates on the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress
defeated moves to transfer administration of the [Executive Order]
Program to the EEOC. The transfer would have removed all fair
employment power from the executive branch and brought the entire
presidential responsibility ....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over
the matter. Courtg can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only
by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
See also Long, supra note 62, at 1091 n.86. Long applies the three-part test to treatment of seniority
systems under Executive Order No. 11,246. Id. at 1093-1101.
85. 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-514 (1988). See, e.g., Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d
Cir. 1964).
86. 40 U.S.C. § 471 (emphasis added).
87. See Long, supra note 62, at 1101. See also Walterscheid, supra note 63, at 573 ("ITihere
must be 'a reasonably close nexus between the efficiency and economy criteria of the Procurement
Act and any exactions imposed upon federal contractors by Executive Orders promulgated under
its authority' for such exactions to lie within the statutory grant.") (quoting Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 1981)).
88. See Walterscheid, supra note 63, at 574 n.71 (citing Legal Aid Soc'y of Alameda County
v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1329 n.14 (9th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied sub nor., 447 U.S. 921 (1980);
United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 465-68 (5th Cir. 1977); Contractors
Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171-73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
89. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709(d), 78 Stat. 263 (1964). This provision
is no longer in Title VII, but the Act now requires the EEOC to coordinate recordkeeping requirements
with other state and federal agencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1988). See also Long, supra note
62, at 1093.
90. Long, supra note 62, at 1093-94 (citing 110 CoNo. REc. 13,650-52 (1964)).
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field under congressional control. By rejecting that transfer, Congress
allowed a continuance of an independent executive order program.
• . . [Another] attempt to make Title VII and the Equal Pay Act the
exclusive federal remedies for employment discrimination, thus evis-
cerating the Program, was also defeated. Finally, a 1971 House Report
on proposed amendments to Title VII noted the fundamental com-
patibility of Title VII and Executive Order No. 11,246 by stating:
"The two programs are addressed to the same basic mission-the
elimination of discrimination in employment. The obligations imposed
on the government contractor by the Executive Order ... reinforce
the obligations imposed by Title VI."'
Even if Congress has authorized Executive Order No. 11,246 as a
whole through recognition in Title VII, provisions of the Order must be
construed consistently with Title VII's requirements. 92 An example of a
construction of Executive Order No. 11,246 conflicting with a provision
of Title VII occurs in the treatment of seniority systems. Courts have
struck down the OFCCP's interpretation of Executive Order No. 11,246
as providing a remedy for discrimination caused by the operation of
"bona fide" seniority systems; such a construction, those courts held,
directly contradicts the will of Congress expressed in Title VII's exemption
from unlawful employment discrimination practices resulting from the
operation of bona fide seniority systems. The seniority system example
is instructive because it is directly analogous to the OFCCP's interpretation
of Executive Order No. 11,246 as applying to tribal contractors in the
face of tribes' express exemption from coverage by Title VII.
Section 703(h) of Title VII states that an employer does not violate
the statute when disparate treatment of employees results from the op-
eration of a "bona fide seniority system." 93 In International Brotherhood
91. Id. at 1094 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 1387-98 (1972)).
92. See Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania, 442 F.2d at 171-72 ("[tlhe Executive isbound by the express prohibitions of Title VII"); Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563
F.2d 216, 237 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd, United Steelworker's of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) ("I do not disagree with the majority's conclusion
that if a conflict between the Executive Order and Title VII exists, it should be resolved in favor
of Title VII. But . . . [h]ere, the two are not in conflict."). In Weber, the Supreme Court reversed,
on the basis of Title VII only, the Fifth Circuit's holding that the affirmative action plan in question
was invalid; the Supreme Court's only mention of Executive Order No. 11,246 was in a footnote
stating that it need not determine the validity of the plan under the Order. See Weber, 443 U.S.
at' 209 n.9.
However, in another case in which it decided the validity of OFCCP regulations regarding disclosure
of information provided under Executive Order No. 11,246, the Supreme Court stated that "in
order for such regulations to have the 'force and effect of law,' it is necessary to establish a nexus
between the regulations and some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress."
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979).
93. Section 703(h) provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [Title], it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences are not the result of
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
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of Teamsters v. United States,94 the Supreme Court confronted the ques-
tion of whether the operation of a seniority system is unlawful if it is
non-discriminatory on its face, but tacitly perpetuates the effect of pre-
Title VII discrimination. Earlier, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,91 the
Court stated that, under Title VII, "practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained
if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices" 96 (i.e., discrimination that occurred prior to the
passage of Title VII). In Teamsters, the Court acknowledged that a
seniority system that continues the effect of pre-Title VII discrimination
would fall within the Griggs rationale "[wiere it not for § 703(h)." ' 97 It
then examined the legislative history of section 703(h) to determine the
congressional intent behind the protection afforded by the statute.
The Court focused on the Title VII supporters' response to the sig-
nificant criticism that the legislation "would destroy existing seniority
rights." ' 98 Both the bill's proponents and the United States Department
of Justice consistently maintained that Title VII would in no way affect
seniority rights. 99 The Court then noted that section 703(h) was added
''as part of ... [a] compromise substitute bill that cleared the way for
the passage of Title VII." 1°° A purpose of the compromise bill was "to
resolve the ambiguities in the House-passed" bill, one of which "concerned
Title VII's impact on existing collectively bargained seniority rights.'
10 1
From the debates on the compromise bill, the Court concluded:
[Section] 703(h) was drafted with an eye toward meeting the earlier
criticism on this issue with an explicit provision embodying the un-
derstanding and assurances of the Act's proponents, namely, that
Title VII would not outlaw such differences in treatment among
94. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
95. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
96. Id. at 430.
97. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 349.
98. Id. at 350.
99. Id. at 350-51. The Court quoted from memoranda by Senators Clark and Case:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective
and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in
the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into
effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non-
discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites
in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers
hired earlier. ...
Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes
effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event
of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would
not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even in the case where
owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had
more seniority than Negroes.
Id. (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 352.
101. Id.
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employees as flowed from a bona fide seniority system that allowed
for full exercise of seniority accumulated before the effective date of
the Act.102
Therefore, the Court held that if an employer's seniority system is "bona
fide"-that is, it was not originally created for the purpose of discrim-
inating on any of the bases covered by Title VIIl° 3-the employer cannot
be liable under Title VII for its continued operation. This holds true
even if the seniority system perpetuates the effects of discrimination that
occurred prior to the passage of Title VII.' °4
OFCCP interpretation of Executive Order No. 11,246, however, con-
siders any bona fide seniority system perpetuating discrimination to violate
the antidiscrimination provision of the Order. 0 5 The agency's regulations
do not address seniority systems per se; however, the OFCCP's Federal
Contract Compliance Manua ° (Manual) states that its policy is "the
elimination of 'systemic discrimination,"' which it defines as practices
that "though often neutral on their face, serve to differentiate or to
perpetuate a differentiation in terms of conditions of employment of
applicants or employees because of their race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, or veteran's status."' 0 7 The Manual cites as an example of a
practice that perpetuates past discrimination "[c]ollective bargaining agree-
ments with seniority provisions that penalize movement between seniority
units," 108 and provides a remedy to those employees who are discriminated
against in such a system. 9 OFCCP field agents are instructed to "ap-
proximate where those class members would have been but for the systemic
discrimination ... and fashion a remedy to achieve as quickly as is
reasonably possible the rightful place of these class members" in the
seniority ranks." 0
The OFCCP's position on bona fide seniority systems directly contra-
dicts the holding of Teamsters. However, the circuits that have addressed
102. Id.
103. Teamster, 431 U.S. at 355-56.
104. Id. at 353-54. Retroactive seniority can be part of a remedy for individuals who have proven
unlawful discrimination under Title VII. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
105. This analysis of the OFCCP's position on seniority systems appears in Long, supra note
62, at 1088-90.
106. OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FEDERAL
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE MANUAL (1980).
107. Id. at § 1-60.96.
108. Id. at § 7-30.5a.
109. Id. at § 7-30.5al.
110. Id. at § 7-50.3. A commentator notes the effect of this remedy on individuals in the seniority
system:
Although the OFCCP discourages "bumping" employees out of their positions, it
requires opportunities for accelerated seniority advancement for discriminatees when
vacancies occur in seniority structures. This kind of remedy will necessarily have
an adverse impact on the expectations of beneficiaries of the existing seniority
system. The latter will not suffer an absolute reduction in seniority status, but their
advancement will be slowed as discriminatees are promoted past them to fill openings
occurring at higher levels in the system.
Long, supra note 62, at 1089.
Spring 1996]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
this conflict have interpreted section 703(h) of Title VII broadly as an
expression of national policy not confined to Title VII and therefore
applicable to Executive Order No. 11,246 or any other statute or order
implicating seniority rights. In United States v. East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc.,"' the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's claim based
on Executive Order No. 11,246 for retroactive seniority rights under a
system virtually identical to that at issue in Teamsters (such as, one that
was not administered in a discriminatory manner but perpetuated the
effects of pre-Title VII discrimination). The court first reiterated the rule
that "an order of the Executive has the force of law only 'if it is not
in conflict with an express statutory provision.' ' 1 2 Then, citing language
and reasoning in Teamsters, "not based on any specific words in Title
VII but on the fixed intent of Congress and the policy behind that
intent,""' the Fifth Circuit held that "Congress has declared for a policy
that a bona fide seniority system shall be lawful.""14 Therefore, the court
concluded, "[tihe Executive may not, in defiance of such policy, make
unlawful-or penalize-a bona fide seniority system.""' 5 As further ra-
tionale, the East Texas Motor court cited the Supreme Court's statement
in Teamsters that Title VII had given courts "broad equitable powers
...to give the 'most complete relief possible' . . . to identified individual
victims [of discrimination].""16 "If such relief is the 'most complete ...
possible,"' the court added, "the Executive Order could scarcely be
interpreted to demand more." 1"7 Finally, the Fifth Circuit noted, in support
of its holding that the language of section 703(h) is not limited only to
Title VII, that the Supreme Court itself remanded a claim for seniority
relief under a different civil rights statute"' "'for further consideration
in light of' the Teamsters decision. ' ' 19
The United State Court of Appeals for t~e D.C. Circuit embraced the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of congressional intent as not limiting
section 703(h)'s protection of bona fide seniority systems to Title VII
only. United States v. Trucking Management, Inc. ,120 involved consid-
eration of whether the operation of the same seniority system at issue
in Teamsters would justify relief under Executive Order No. 11,246 for
perpetuating past discrimination. The court noted the novelty of the
government's narrow reading of section 703(h): "Before Teamsters, the
Government never had to construe Title VII's legislative history as ex-
pressing congressional approval of a more far-reaching executive power
111. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
112. Id. at 185 (quoting United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 465 (5th




116. Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364).
117. Id.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
119. East Texas Motor, 564 F.2d at 185 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364).
120. 662 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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to remedy past discrimination perpetuated by bona fide seniority systems"
because, before Teamsters, courts had held that Title VII itself invalidated
the operation of otherwise bona fide seniority systems that perpetuated
the effects of past discrimination. 2 The court continued:
We find appellants' present efforts to reassess the legislative history
strained and unconvincing. As originally enacted, Title VII made only
one reference to the entire Executive Order program, and that wasinserted into the legislative history without debate or commentary.
The legislative history of section 703(h), the section of Title VII
explicitly concerned with seniority systems, made no mention of the
Executive Order. At the same time, however, the legislative history
of that section exhibited considerable congressional concern and strug-
gle to preserve the vested seniority rights of workers without major
curtailment of Title VII's overriding objective of eliminating em-
ployment discrimination ....
A fair reading of the same legislative history suggests that Congress
simply did not consider, either in 1964 when it passed Title VII, or
in 1972 when it amended it, whether the Executive could or should
reach beyond Title VII to redress any discrimination which a facially
neutral bona fide seniority system might perpetuate. The Government's
construction of section 703(h) would require us to conclude that
Congress somehow intended to permit the Executive independently to
modify or dismantle concededly bona fide seniority systems. We find
it highly unlikely that Congress would have impliedly approved Ex-
ecutive interference with the same bona fide seniority systems it had
deliberately immunized under section 703(h).122
Thus, despite the overall validity of Executive Order No. 11,246, the
OFCCP cannot interpret it in a way that contradicts the will of Congress.
As will be argued below, the same reasoning that applies to the OFCCP's
treatment of bona fide seniority systems applies to the OFCCP's en-
forcement of Executive Order No. 11,246 against Native American tribes.
Just as Title VII exempts bona fide seniority systems from its coverage,
Title VII also exempts tribal employers from its coverage. Borrowing the
121. Id. at 43. For this reason, the D.C. Circuit rejected the government's reliance on the Third
Circuit's statement in Contractors Ass'n, 442 F.2d at 172, that "§ 703(h) is a limitation only upon
Title VII, not upon any other remedies":
Not only was [Contractors Ass'n] decided before Teamsters when no court or
legislator had focused on any distinction between Title VII and the Executive Order,
but it was based on the affirmative action obligations of the Executive Order whichhave only prospective application. Those obligations could not be applied here to
provide retroactive seniority relief. Furthermore, because the court in Contractors
Ass'n evaluated the seniority system discussed there under pre-Teamsters standards,
there was no finding as here that the seniority systems at issue were protected by§ 703(h).
Trucking Management, 662 F.2d at 43, n.56 (emphasis added).
The same criticism applies to the Third Circuit's holding in EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
556 F.2d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978), in which the court found that
sections 703(a), (h), and (j) do not bar affirmative action provisions of a consent decree and seniority
relief thereunder.
122. Trucking Management, 662 F.2d at 44 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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D.C. Circuit Court's language in Trucking Management, it is "highly
unlikely that Congress would have impliedly approved Executive inter-
ference with the same tribal employers it had deliberately immunized
under Title VII.' ' 23
III. NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES ARE UNLIKE OTHER
FEDERAL CONTRACTORS
A. Tribes' Sovereign Status
Federal policy toward Native American tribes acknowledges and respects
their status as sovereign nations. All three branches consider the federal/
tribal relationship as one of "government-to-government."' ' 24 Federal law
recognizes that tribes, as sovereign nations preexisting the United States,
25
retain all aspects of sovereignty they have not ceded through treaties or
lost through congressional enactment. 126 Although Congress has legislative
power over tribes, its policy within the last twenty-five years has been
to exercise such power sparingly 27 and to curtail judicial incursions into
sovereignty. 28 The Congressional findings of the recent Tribal Self-Gov-
ernance Act of 1994129 reflect this policy:
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (West Supp. 1996); Indian Self-
Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250; Presidential Doc-
uments, Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed.
Reg. 22,951 (1994).
125. See Vicki J. Limas, Employment Suits Against Indian Tribes: Balancing Sovereign Rights
and Civil Rights, 70 DENv. U. L. REv. 359, 364-65 (1993) (citations omitted):
Tribal sovereignty derives from tribes' status as self-governing nations whose existence
predates that of the United States. From the time of contact, first the European
nations, then the colonies and then the United States government, recognized Indian
tribes as nations and interacted with them through intergovernmental treaties. The
United States Constitution acknowledges the sovereignty of Indian tribes as well,
and recognizes them on a par with foreign nations and the states as entities with
which Congress may regulate commercial dealings. Also, the Constitution excludes
Indians from population counts for representation and taxation purposes.
Id.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (citations omitted):
[Ojur cases recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up their full sovereignty.
We have recently said: 'Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory ... .' The sovereignty
that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at
the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress
acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.
Id.
127. Limas, supra note 1, at 690 ("[Uinder current federal policy favoring tribal sovereignty,
self-determination, and economic self-sufficiency, Congress is reluctant to derogate its policy by
exercising its prerogative to limit or abolish tribal rights"). Cf. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability
of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 85, 107-08 (1991); Bruce A. Wagman, Advancing Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Pathway
to Power, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 419, 424 (1993).
128. In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Supreme Court held that tribes could not exercise
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on their land by Native Americans who were not members
of their tribe. Congress promptly restored tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. Act of Oct.
28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994)). For an account
of Congress's correction of Duro, see Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro
v. Reina, 17 AM. INrDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992).
129. The Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, is part of the Indian Self-Determination Act
Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. 2, §§ 201-204, tit. 4, §§ 401-408, 108 Stat. 4250.
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Congress finds that-
(1) the tribal right of self-government flows from the inherent
sovereignty of Indian tribes and nations;
(2) the United States recognizes a special government-to-govern-
ment relationship with Indian tribes, including the right of the tribes
to self-governance, as reflected in the Constitution, treaties, Federal
statutes, and the course of dealings of the United States with Indian
tribes .... 130
In recognizing Native American tribes as sovereign nations, federal
policy actively promotes tribal self-determination and economic self-suf-
ficiency:
It is the policy of this title to permanently establish and implement
tribal self-governance-
(1) to enable the United States to maintain and improve its unique
and continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, Indian tribes;
(2) to permit each Indian tribe to choose the extent of the par-
ticipation of such tribe in self-governance;
(5) to permit an orderly transition from Federal domination of
programs and services to provide Indian tribes with meaningful au-
thority to plan, conduct, redesign, and administer programs, services,
functions, and activities that meet the needs of the individual tribal
communities .... 3
Modern federal legislation concerning tribes is directed toward these goals
of tribal self-determination and economic self-sufficiency, 3 2 and such
legislation is broadly interpreted by the courts in favor of tribes to
accomplish these goals. 33
A crucial aspect of sovereignty is the sovereign's immunity from suit
without its permission. '14 Federal law has long recognized that tribes retain
this aspect of their sovereignty unless it has been waived by Congress
130. Id. § 202 (emphasis added).
131. Id. § 203 (emphasis added).
132. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-544 (1984); Indian Self-Deter-
mination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-459e (1994); Indian
Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-03, 1611-15, 1621, 1631-33, 1651-58, 1661, 1671-
75, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f,n,qq, 1396j (1992); Indian Employment, Training and Related Services
Demonstration Act of 1992, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3401-17 (Supp. 1995); Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 3601 (Supp. 1996).
133. See Wagman, supra note 127, at 424-25 ("Statutes supporting self-determination are usually
given broad deference and pro-Indian construction.").
As a matter of fact, courts are required to interpret all legislation affecting tribal interests liberally
and to resolve ambiguities in favor of those tribal interests. See County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). Furthermore, statutes must be interpreted in accordance with
current federal policy toward Native Americans regardless of the policy in effect at the time they
were enacted. See Santa Rose Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977), cited with approval in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,
388 (1976); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 1141 (1990).
134. A discussion of the bases of federal, state, and tribal sovereign immunity appears in Wagman,
supra note 127, at 438-49.
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or the tribe itself.135 Furthermore, any waiver of sovereign immunity must
be "unequivocally expressed;" a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot
be implied. 136
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez illustrates and summarizes principles
of federal Indian law concerning tribal sovereignty and sovereign im-
munity. There, the Supreme Court addressed tribal immunity and federal
jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).' 3 The ICRA grants
civil rights to individual tribal members concerning their tribes' govern-
ments similar to those rights granted American citizens in the Bill of
Rights to the United States Constitution. 38 Of particular relevance to a
discussion of employment rights is the ICRA's requirement that tribes
afford due process and equal protection rights to their members; these
provisions encompass claims of discrimination or other types of unfair
treatment. 3 9 Although Martinez was not an employment case, it concerned
a violation of equal protection rights under the ICRA. 140 The plaintiffs
sued the Pueblo and its governor in federal district court claiming that
the Pueblo's membership ordinance violated ICRA's equal protection
clause.14' The tribal ordinance extended membership rights to children of
male members who marry nonmembers but not to children of female
members who marry nonmembers. 42
The Martinez Court held that the ICRA did not waive the Pueblo's
immunity from suit and did not confer federal jurisdiction over the claim
135. See, e.g., United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940)
("Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional authorization"); Puyallup Tribe, Inc.
v. Dep't of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977) ("Absent an effective waiver or consent,
... a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe."); Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) ("Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers . . . . '[W]ithout con-
gressional authorization,' the 'Indian Nations are exempt from suit."'); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) ("Suits against
Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional
abrogation.").
136. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58.
137. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1341 (1994).
138. Id. § 1302. Because tribal governments pre-date the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
stated that the United States Constitution does not apply to them. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376, 382-84 (1896); accord Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56. Rights accorded by the ICRA, however, are
"similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment."
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 57. The ICRA requires tribes to afford rights to their citizens of free exercise
of religion, speech, press, assembly, due process, and equal protection; rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures and governmental taking without just compensation; and, in criminal cases,
rights against double jeopardy and self-incrimination, and rights to speedy trials, confrontation and
securing of witnesses, counsel at defendant's expense, and trial by a jury of six. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
The ICRA also prohibits excessive bail and fines, cruel and unusual punishment, imprisonment over
one year per offense, fines in excess of $5,000, bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302. An account of the legislative history of the ICRA appears in VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD
LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITIN: THE PAST AND FuTuRE OF AmsaRcAN INDIAN SOVEREIoNTY 200-14
(1984).
139. See Limas, supra note 125, at 382-85.
140. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 54-55.
141. Id. at 53.
142. Id. at 51-52.
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against the governor. 43 The only specific relief Congress provided under
the ICRA was for habeas corpus, and the Court noted that the respondent
in a suit for such relief would be an individual, not the tribe. 144 The
Court discussed its long-standing recognition of tribal sovereign immunity
and the rule that a waiver of immunity must be express and unequivocal.14
The ICRA's provision for relief against an individual could not be deemed
a general waiver of immunity for a tribe, the Court reasoned. 146
In holding that the ICRA did not confer federal jurisdiction for claims
other than habeas actions, Martinez relied on principles of tribal sov-
ereignty. It reiterated early Supreme Court holdings that "tribes are
'distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights' in matters of local self-government"' 147 and "the power of regulating
their internal and social relations. 'J '. 48 The Court found that, in enacting
the ICRA, Congress intended to promote the dual interests of "strength-
ening the position of individual tribal members" and "promot[ing] the
well-established federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-government." 1 49
Balancing those goals, the Court concluded that "[c]reation of a federal
cause of action for the enforcement of rights created in [the ICRA] ...
plainly would be at odds with the congressional goal of protecting tribal
self-government." 150
Tribes' retention and use of sovereign immunity is directly related to
their ability to achieve the federally stated goal of self-determination.
One commentator states that "the dire economic status of most American
Indian groups" must inform federal policy and decisions regarding tribal
sovereign immunity:
Tribal sovereign immunity is one of the last strongholds of the promise
of self-determination that has not been removed or effectively gutted
.... [Flortification of the doctrine is directly in line with the policy
of tribal self-determination and economic self-sufficiency, and any
decrease in its protection would be "inconsistent with overriding
interests of the National Government" which are now directed at
tribal sustenance and restoration. 5'
The Supreme Court recently reiterated and strengthened the doctrine
of tribal sovereign immunity in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.'12 There the State of Okla-
143. Id. at 72.
144. Id. at 59.
145. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58.
146. Id. at 59.
147. Id. at 55 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
148. Id. (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)).
149. Id. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
150. Id. at 64.
151. Wagman, supra note 127, at 471 (citations omitted). See also Note, In Defense of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1058, 1069-74 (1982).
152. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). For a critical discussion of Citizen Band Potawatomi, but one that
ultimately reaches the conclusion that the case represents a "steadfast, acceptance and reaffirmation
of the near-absolute nature of tribal immunity[,]" see Wagman, supra note 127, at 465-70.
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homa attempted to sue the Potawatomi Indian Tribe in state court for
taxes on the Tribe's cigarette sales.53 The State pressed the Court to
abolish the doctrine of tribal immunity altogether, or alternatively, to
limit it to the Tribes' governmental, rather than business, activities.
5 4
The Court refused to limit the doctrine in any way,'55 and thus reaffirmed
its longstanding recognition of the doctrine. Citing Congress' stated goals
of tribal self-government, self-sufficiency, and economic development in
legislation such as the Indian Financing Act of 197456 and the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 157 the Court reasoned
that elimination of sovereign immunity for tribal businesses would es-
sentially destroy the ability of the tribes to attain these goals.'
B. Tribal Dependency on Federal Funding
Although tribes are sovereign nations, they are economically weak
compared to state and local governments and private sector federal
contractors. Most Native American tribes are virtually dependent upon
federal contracts and grants for their very existence. 1 9 Unlike states and
municipal governments, tribes have little economic base to support their
governments. The average income of Native American workers living on
or near reservations is $7,000 per year. 6° In 1989, 47.3 percent of families
living on reservations or trust land lived below the poverty level, compared
to 11.5 percent of families nationwide. 16' The median family income on
reservations and trust lands was $13,489, compared to $34,213 nation-
wide.' 62 The United States government's estimate of the unemployment
rate for Native Americans is 45 percent, but the actual rate is probably
much higher. 63
153. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 507.
154. Id. at 510.
155. Id.
156. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544 (1994).
157. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458hh (1994).
158. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 510.
159. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.
L. REF. 277, 284 (1993).
160. ARLENE HIRSCHFELDER & MARTHA KREIPE DE MONTANO, THE NATIVE AMERICAN ALMANAC:
A PORTRAIT OF NATIVE AMERICA TODAY 211 (1993).
161. Dirk Johnson, Economies Come to Life on Indian Reservations, N.Y. TIMEs, July 3, 1994,
at Al, AI0, All (referencing statistics from the Census Bureau and National Indian Policy Center).
162. Id.
163. See HIRSCHFELDER & DE MONTANO, supra note 160, at 211. The authors explain the reasons
for this conclusion:
The official estimate of Native American unemployment is forty-five percent, while
the average unemployment rate for the United States is eight percent. Judging from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' figures, the unemployment problem for American
Indians seems severe. However, since the Bureau of Labor Statistics' estimate does
not include those who are discouraged from seeking work, the real unemployment
rate for Native Americans may be much higher. In 1985, the Full Employment
Action Council reported that Native American unemployment may in fact be as
high as eighty-seven percent on some reservations. Some of the most commonly
cited reasons for high unemployment for Native Americans are poor education,
discrimination, and the lack of industry on and near reservations.
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Tribal businesses and income-generating ventures represent efforts by
tribes to free themselves from government funding and thereby attain
"true sovereignty." 1 64 To the extent that tribes "profit" from income
derived through federal contracts, such profit accrues to the common-
wealth of the tribe as a nation to operate its government and provide
services to its citizens. As one commentator put it, "Indian economic
development may be less about creating wealth than it is about creating
the conditions for political power in the context of socially responsible
choices for the continued existence and cohesion of the Indian nation."'' 65
Management of employment relations within tribally owned and operated
businesses is truly an exercise of tribal sovereignty. 66
IV. INCOMPATIBILITY OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN STATUS
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11,246
As discussed previously, the antidiscrimination executive orders resulted
from the exclusion of certain minority groups, primarily African Amer-
icans, from the workforce. 67 The same motivation, of course, existed
behind the passage of Title VII and other civil rights laws, which were
more broadly based. 16 Such laws protecting minority group rights were
enacted for the purpose of integrating those groups into the entire political,
economic, and social realms of American society. 69 Federal laws governing
Native American rights, on the other hand, protect the "cultural sepa-
rateness and political autonomy" of Native Americans, "a special pro-
tection of a separate minority population.' '1 70
This distinction-between the federal goal of broad inclusion of minority
groups into mainstream American society and the federal goal of pres-
164. See Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or Dependence? The Practical
Value and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 531, 560-61
(1994) (citation omitted):
We came to the realization that rather than seeking the help of government agencies
and departments, or of other countries and Indian nations, or of private persons
and charitable groups, we needed to empower ourselves as a people and to develop
our own resources. We could not allow these outside groups, whether political
bodies or charities .. . to define for us what our lives should be. We could not
claim to be truly sovereign and yet remain dependent on others. We would have
to make the difference in our futures and in our lives.
Id.
165. John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of Sovereignty, 39
BUFF. L. REV. 495, 499 (1991).
166. A Native American commentator relates employment opportunities to the sovereignty of his
tribe as follows:
The greatest accomplishment .. . is the renewed self-esteem of our people and the
renewed hope that has accompanied new opportunity. This is the result of real,
practical economic sovereignty according to our definition and under our control.
Even if resources were made available to us by grant or charity, it is immeasurably
more satisfying to have achieved all of this from our own effort and hard work.
Halbritter & McSloy, supra note 164, at 571.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
168. See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE (1985).
169. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AmRiAcAN INDIAN LAW 1 (3d ed. 1991).
170. Id.
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ervation of one "minority" group's political and cultural separateness
from mainstream American society-lies at the heart of this discussion
of Executive Order No. 11,246. Congress recognized this distinction in
drafting the federal antidiscrimination statutes, as do the courts in applying
them; the executive branch does not when it attempts to apply Executive
Order No. 11,246 to tribes.
A. The Antidiscrimination Statutes
Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes reflect Congress' intent
that tribal employers occupy a "unique legal status" free from govern-
mental interference.' 7' Those statutes recognize the need for "special
protection" of Native American groups. In particular, Native American
tribes are expressly excluded from coverage by Title VII.' 72 By this
exclusion, Congress recognized tribes' status as self-governing sovereigns
like the federal government, which it also originally excluded from cov-
erage by Title VII.' 71
The exclusion of tribes from Title VII's coverage was proposed by
Senator Mundt of South Dakota as an amendment to the Senate bill's
definition of "employer":
To a large extent many tribes control and operate their own affairs,
even to the extent of having their own elected officials, courts and
police forces. This amendment would provide to American Indian
tribes in their capacity as a political entity [sic], the same privileges
accorded to the U.S. Government and its political subdivisions, to
conduct their own affairs and economic activities without consideration
of the provisions of the bill.'74
In his remarks, Mundt compared this amendment to the other amendment
concerning Native Americans he had already successfully introduced,
which allowed employers operating on or near reservations to preferentially
hire Native Americans living on or near the reservation.' Both of these
171. A similar discussion of the history of the exclusion of tribes from coverage of antidiscrimination
statutes appears in Limas, supra note 1, at 715-23.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). This sections states that:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of
such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United states, a corporation
wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any
department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures
of the competitive service ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
173. Id. Title VII was amended in 1972 to cover the United States government as an employer.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16).
174. 110 CONG. REc. 13,702 (1964) (emphasis added).
175. This provision is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i):
Nothing contained in this subchapter [setting forth unlawful employment practices]
shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with
respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise
under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an
Indian living on or near a reservation.
[Vol. 26
FEDERAL CONTRACTS WITH NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES
amendments, he asserted, would "assure our American Indians of the
continued right to protect and promote their own interests and to benefit
from Indian preference programs now in operation or later to be in-
stituted, '1 76 adding that Native Americans comprise "the one minority
group in the United States which has suffered the longest and the most
from the callous indifference and the poor judgment of Americans gen-
erally." 1 77
The intent reflected in Senator Mundt's statements-that tribes are
sovereigns in their own right and are entitled to exercise control over
their own interests without congressional interference-was reiterated by
the Supreme Court when it interpreted the 1972 amendments to Title
VII. These amendments extended Title VII's coverage to employment by
state, local, and federal governments. 7 1
In Morton v. Mancari,79 the Court held that these amendments to
Title VII did not repeal the Indian hiring preference provision of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934180 for Bureau of Indian Affairs em-
ployment."' The Court observed that tribes were not mentioned at all
in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, 8 2 and that both pro-
visions of Title VII concerning tribes-the exclusion of tribes from the
definition of "employer" and the hiring preference for Native Americans
living on or near a reservation-remained intact after the 1972 amend-
ments.8 3 Both provisions, the Court found, reflected the "longstanding
federal policy" of congressional deference to tribal sovereignty by "pro-
viding a unique legal status to Indians in matters concerning tribal or
'on or near' reservation employment."' 4
Congress continued to express its intent not to interfere with tribal
sovereignty in employment matters when it expressly excluded Native
American tribes from the definition of "employer" in the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).'85 Title I of the ADA prohibits
discrimination against disabled individuals who are otherwise qualified
to hold the job in question and imposes a duty upon the employer to
"reasonably accommodate" the individual's disability.8 6 The legislative
history of the ADA does not explain why tribes are excluded from the
definition of "employer," except to say that Congress borrowed the
176. 110 CoNG. REc. 13,702 (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Federal
employment was added to Title VII's coverage at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; state and local governments
were deleted from Title VII's original exclusions from its definition of "employer" at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b).
179. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
180. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1988).
181. Mancari, 417 at 553-54.
182. Id. at 547.
183. Id. at 548.
184. Id. at 547-48 (recognizing that tribes and their members enjoy a distinct political status as
opposed to a racial status) (emphasis added).
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. IV 1992).
186. Id. § 12111(9).
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procedural framework of the ADA from that of Title VII and that Title
VII's definition of "employer" was part of that procedural framework.
8 7
Although Congress did not mention tribes in its definition of "em-
ployer" in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 188
the two circuits that have addressed the question have interpreted the
ADEA to exclude tribes from its coverage because of tribal sovereignty.
In EEOC v. Cherokee Nation,189 the Tenth Circuit held that the ADEA
did not authorize the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
to investigate a charge of age discrimination against the Cherokee Nation's
Director of Health and Human Services because tribes are exempt from
the statute's coverage.190 The ADEA's definition of "employer" is virtually
identical to that of Title VII except for mentioning tribes.' 9' The court
reasoned that, because the application of the ADEA would involve sov-
ereign tribal rights, the difference between the two statutes' language
created an ambiguity that, under federal law, must be resolved in favor
of the tribe by excluding it from coverage by the ADEA.
92
The Eighth Circuit used similar reasoning in EEOC v. Fond du Lac
Heavy Equipment and Construction Co.,' 91 in which it affirmed the
dismissal of an age discrimination case against a tribally owned business
by a member of the tribe. It found the suit to involve a matter of tribal
sovereignty:
Subjecting such an employment relationship between the tribal member
and his tribe to federal control and supervision dilutes the sovereignty
of the tribe. The consideration of a tribe member's age by a tribal
employer should be allowed to be restricted (or not restricted) by the
tribe in accordance with its culture and traditions.94
Because application of the ADEA would impinge on tribal sovereignty,
the court resolved the ambiguity resulting from the ADEA's silence in
favor of the tribe and held that the tribe was not a covered employer
under the ADEA. 95
The "unique legal status" Congress affords tribal employment in the
antidiscrimination statutes must be respected in the interpretation and
application of Executive Order No. 11,246. A tribe's culture and the
way employment is treated in that culture is part of that "unique legal
187. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 54, pt. 3, at 31 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 306, 445, 454-55 (citation omitted).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1990). The ADEA prohibits discrimination against individuals over age 40.
Id. § 631.
189. 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).
190. Id. at 939.
191. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
192. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d at 939.
193. 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993).
194. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 251. Both Cherokee Nation and Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment contained dissents
that would have interpreted the ADEA. to apply to tribes. For discussion and criticism of the
dissents' reasoning as being contrary to federal law, see Limas, supra note 1, at 721-26.
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status," as the Eighth Circuit acknowledged. A commentator explains
this point:
[C]onceptions of equality specific to one culture are not useful tools
to assess the justice of practices and beliefs of another culture. For
example, one conception of equality declares that political rights and
responsibilities ought to be distributed among citizens without regard
to racial or cultural difference. This stands in stark contrast to the
distributive principle adhered to in a society that distributes political
rights and responsibilities by reference to, say, lineage. That society's
distributive principle might conform to a particular conception of
equality, namely, that all who are of a certain lineage be treated
equally. A distribution based on lineage, however, is a far cry from
the conception of equality that prohibits consideration of race or
cultural difference. 1 96
Congress's recognition of the "unique legal status" of tribal employment
by legislatively excluding it from governmental oversight accommodates
cultural differences and advances the congressional policy promoting tribal
sovereignty. Judicial interpretation and application of these statutes like-
wise reflect the policy of tribal sovereignty. In attempting to apply the
Order to Native American tribes in direct contravention of Congress's
exemption of tribes from Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws,
the OFCCP acts without statutory authority and against federal policy,
just as it does when it ignores Congress's protection of bona fide seniority
systems under section 703(h) of Title VII.
B. Statutory Indian Preferences
The tribal employment preference provisions of Title VII 197 and other
statutes further indicate that Congress d6es not intend the antidiscri-
mination requirements of Executive Order No. 11,246, along with their
cumbersome compliance regulations, to apply to tribal employment. 19
Recall that Senator Mundt, who introduced the preference provision into
Title VII, characterized it and the provision to exclude tribes from Title
VII's coverage as a means of assuring tribes "of the continued right to
protect and promote their own interests." 199 Furthermore, in Morton v.
Mancari, the Supreme Court noted the pervasiveness of Indian preferences
throughout the history of the United States' dealings with tribes and
matters affecting tribes:
The federal policy of according some hiring preference to Indians in
the Indian service dates at least as far back as 1834. Since that time,
Congress repeatedly has enacted various preferences of the general
196. Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1311, 1351-52 (1993).
197. See supra note 172, for the text of this provision.
198. Recall that the OFCCP regulations implementing Executive Order No. 11,246 contain a
Native American hiring preference provision. See supra text accompanying note 172. Indeed, the
Order itself contains a similar hiring preference provision.
199. 110 CONG. REC. 13,702. See supra text accompanying note 174.
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type here at issue. The purpose of these preferences, as variously
expressed in the legislative history, has been to give Indians a greater
participation in their own self-government; to further the Government's
trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative
effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian
tribal life.20
The Court also characterized Title VII's exemption of tribes as employers
and its preference provision as "a clear congressional recognition, within
the framework of Title VII, of the unique legal status of tribal and
reservation-based activities.' '201 Citing Senator Humphrey's statement, the
Court added that "[tihis exemption is consistent with the Federal Gov-
ernment's policy of encouraging Indian employment and with the special
legal position of Indians.
'20 2
As discussed previously, Mancari held that the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, which extended that Act's prohibition of discrimination to
federal, state, and local employment, did not repeal Indian preference
laws. 20 3 In its reasoning, the Court explained that the fundamental dif-
ference between antidiscrimination laws and Indian preference laws
is a prototypical case where an adjudication of repeal by implication
is not appropriate. The preference is a longstanding, important com-
ponent of the Government's Indian program. The anti-discrimination
provision, aimed at alleviating minority discrimination in employment,
obviously is designed to deal with an entirely different and, indeed
opposite, problem .... 204
The "problems" that Indian preference provisions address are, of course,
the previously discussed dichotomy between the goals of integrating mi-
nority groups in general into the American labor force and that of
preserving autonomy for a "special" minority group. 205 The preference
provisions allow Native Americans to take "a greater control of their
own destinies"E2 -- that is, maintain their sovereignty-through employ-
ment in activities and services that affect them. 20 7 Tribal employment
200. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1974) (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 545-46 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 546 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964)).
203. Id. at 547.
204. Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 169-171.
206. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553.
207. A Native American commentator states this point eloquently:
It is important to distinguish the desire of Indian peoples to maintain their cultural
identity from similar desires of other minority groups in American society. Indian
people are not looking for "multicultural perspectives" or "diversity" or for
recognition of our contributions to the "melting pot." Our rights are not civil
rights, minority rights, affirmative action rights nor anything of the kind. Our
rights are those of sovereign nations, as recognized in repeated treaties with our
fellow sovereign, the United States . ...
The United States has thus always seen us as separate, and therefore our struggle
to maintain our identity is unlike that of any other ethnic group. The desire of
other groups in American society for equal rights is different from our desire for
sovereignty. We are empathetic to the sufferings of others, but there are fundamental
differences between sovereignty and equal protection or due process.
Halbritter & McSloy, supra note 164, at 555-56 n.85.
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preferences directly advance tribal sovereignty. As a commentator has
pointed out, preference of tribal members in tribally-related businesses
supports a tribal goal which, stated in its most basic terms, involves
the maintenance of tribal identity, integrity, custom, and, in some
circumstances, its very existence. Tribal preference ordinances also
correct much of the discrimination which has kept reservation Indians
from getting jobs or job training. Additionally, tribes have an interest
in creating and maintaining a job market on the reservation to en-
courage Indian labor to remain. 2 8
Congress has recently indicated its approval of a broader reading of
tribal preferences than those recognized by agency regulations. Some
tribes have enacted preference ordinances stating that employment pref-
erence can be made on the basis of tribal membership. 20 9 Even though
OFCCP regulations provide for an Indian preference, 210 however, they
state that a contractor "shall not . . . discriminate among Indians on
the basis of religion, sex, or tribal affiliation." 21 ' Similar language appears
in Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service regulations. 21 2 In
the 1994 amendments to the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975,213 governing federal assistance to tribes in the
form of self-determination contracts, Congress mandates that "with re-
spect to any self-determination contract . . . that is intended to benefit
one tribe, the tribal employment or contract preference laws adopted by
such tribe shall govern with respect to the administration of the contract
.... 214 The purpose of this amendment was to "remove the source of
conflict by endorsing tribal TERO [tribal employment rights ordinances]
where they are in place. ' ' 21 5 Thus, if a tribe discriminates in employment
208. Kevin N. Anderson, Comment, Indian Employment Preference.- Legal Foundations and
Limitations, 15 TULSA L. J. 733, 758 (1980). Cherokee Nation Industries, discussed in supra part
I, was founded by the Cherokee Nation in response to widespread Native American unemployment
in Adair County, Oklahoma.
209. See id. at 766.
210. See supra note 66.
211. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(6) (1995).
212. For example, the Bureau of Indian Affairs prescribes the following Indian preference clause
in its contracts:
(a) The Contractor agrees to give preferences to Indians who can perform the work
required regardless of age (subject to existing laws and regulations), sex, religion,
or tribal affiliation for training and employment opportunities under this contract
48 C.F.R. § 1452.204-71 (1994).
213. 25 U.S.C. § 450.
214. Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 102(4) 108
Stat. 4250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994)) (emphasis added).
215. S. Rep. No. 374, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994). The Senate Report's explanation for the
amendment is as follows:
Section 2(4) amends section 7 of the statute to add a new subsection (c) to recognize
tribal laws addressing employment preferences. Presently, tribal governments are
unable to reconcile the terms of tribal employment rights ordinances (TERO) (which
generally provide for tribal preferences in employment for tribal members) with
section 7(b) of the Act (which establishes a general Indian preference). Presently,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service disagree on the ap-
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in favor of tribal members under its laws, the contracting agency must
follow the tribal law.
As stated in Mancari, tribal preference laws are a "long-standing,
important component" of the federal policy toward Native American
employment. 216 Congress' action in recognizing tribal preference laws in
self-determination contracts reinforces the Congressional policy of tribal
self-determination. OFCCP regulations reject tribal preference laws; thus,
they run counter to federal policy and congressional intent.
There is another reason, given the policy behind preference laws, that
it does not make sense to impose Executive Order No. 11,246 on tribal
employers. The Order is primarily directed toward hiring of racial and
ethnic minorities. But the preference provisions, by their very terms,
exempt tribes from any duty to hire from other racial or ethnic groups.
Under the preference laws, tribal employment will be overwhelmingly
Native American, a "minority" group recognized by the OFCCP. More-
over, preferences on the basis of tribal membership could lawfully exclude
from consideration anyone-male or female-who is not a tribal member.
It simply makes no sense to impose the requirements of Executive Order
No. 11,246 on tribes when tribal employment is by its very nature
employment of "minorities" within the meaning of the OFCCP's own
regulations.
C. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
The most recent congressional pronouncement that the executive order
program is not appropriate to tribal contracts appears in the 1994 amend-
ments of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
(ISDA).217 There Congress makes clear that it did not intend for federal
contracting regulations, including Executive Order No. 11,246, to apply
to self-governance contracts between tribes and the United States under
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,218
which represent the sole source of federal funds for many tribal programs.
Under self-determination contracts, tribes receive lump sums from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Indian Health Service to administer
tribal programs themselves that would otherwise be administered by a
government agency .219
The original purpose of the ISDA was to authorize tribes "to contract
with the federal government to operate programs serving their tribal
members. ' 220 Tribes, rather than the federal government, would thus
administer programs benefitting their members. The Act was passed in
plicability of tribal TERO ordinances to employment under self-determination con-
tract. The new amendment will remove the source of conflict by endorsing tribal
TERO ordinances where they are in place.
216. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 548 (1974).
217. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994)).
218. 25 U.S.C. § 450.
219. Id. § 450(e).
220. S. Rep. No. 374, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994).
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response to President Nixon's 1970 policy statement to Congress on tribal
self-determination:
For years we have talked about encouraging Indians to exercise greater
self-determination, but our progress has never been commensurate
with our promises. Part of the reason for this situation has been the
threat of termination. But another reason is the fact that when adecision is made as to whether a Federal program will be turned over
to Indian administration, it is the federal authorities and not the
Indian people who finally make that decision.
This situation should be reversed. In my judgment, it should be
up to the Indian tribe to determine whether it is willing to assume
administrative responsibility for a service program which is presently
administered by a federal agency. 221
The 1988 ISDA amendments resulted from Congress's realization that
"the original goal of ensuring maximum tribal participation in the planning
and administration of federal services, programs and activities for the
benefit of Indians had been undermined by excessive bureaucracy and
contract requirements. ' ' 222 It noted that "federal bureaucrats had imposed
administrative and reporting requirements on Indian tribes which were
more stringent than the standards which would apply to direct federal
operation of the programs ' 22 and that "the contract approval process
required an average of six months rather than the 60 days mandated by
the Act. ' 224 So Congress mandated that the BIA and the IHS develop
new joint regulations "with the participation of Indian tribes" for the
implementation of contracting under the Act. 225 The regulations were to
be "relatively simple, straightforward, and free of unnecessary require-
ments or procedures. ' 226
The 1988 amendments allowed the agencies one year to promulgate
the new regulations, but the regulations were not proposed until January
20, 1994.227 Congress found the proposed regulations to "contain hundreds
of new requirements . . . [many of which] 'are more restrictive than
existing regulations and raise new obstacles and burdens for Indian tribes
seeking the opportunities for effective tribal self-government promised by
the Act."'' 221 Congress further noted the tribes' dissatisfaction with the
new regulations, as many of the regulations did not comport with the
tribes' understandings of the agreements they had reached with the BIA
and IHS in their consultations with those agencies on the regulations. 229






226. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 274, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987)).
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These findings led to the enactment of the Indian Self-Determination
Contract Reform Act of 1994 (Contract Reform Act).2 a0
The purpose of the Contract Reform Act was to "limit the promulgation
of regulations under the Indian Self-Determination and Education As-
sistance Act and to prescribe the terms and conditions which must be
used in any self-determination contract between an Indian tribe and the
Departments of Interior and Health and Human Services." 23' The Contract
Reform Act totally divests these agencies of the power to issue regulations
governing self-determination contracts, 232 and it enacts terms and speci-
fications for all self-determination contracts.
233
The Contract Reform Act specifically states that, except for "con-
struction contracts," federal contracting laws and regulations do not
apply to self-determination contracts, "except to the extent that such
laws expressly apply to Indian tribes. ' 23 4 It adds a definition of "con-
230. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994)).
231. S. Rep. No. 374, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994).
232. Id. at 3.
233. Id. at 43.
234. Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 102(10), 108 Stat. at 4253. The entire new subsection reads as
follows:
(10) by striking subsection (a) of section 105 and inserting the following new
subsection:
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, subject to paragraph (3) [con-
cerning construction contracts], the contracts and cooperative agreements entered
into with tribal organizations pursuant to section 102 shall not be subject to Federal
contracting or cooperative agreement laws (including any regulations), except to the
extent that such laws expressly apply to Indian tribes.
(2) Program standards applicable to a nonconstruction self-determination contract
shall be set forth in the contract proposal and the final contract of the tribe or
tribal organization.
(3)(A) With respect to a construction contract (or a subcontract of such a con-
struction contract), the provisions of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
(41 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the regulations relating to acquisitions promulgated
under such Act shall apply only to the extent that the application of such provision
to the construction contract (or subcontract) is-
(i) necessary to ensure that the contract may be carried out in a satisfactory
manner;
(ii) directly related to the construction activity; and
(iii) not inconsistent with this Act.
(B) A list of the Federal requirements that meet the requirements of clauses (i)
through (iii) of subparagraph (A) shall be included in an attachment to the contract
pursuant to negotiations between the Secretary and the tribal organization.
(C)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no Federal law listed in clause (ii)
or any other provision of Federal law (including an Executive Order) relating to
acquisition by the Federal Government shall apply to a construction contract that
a tribe or tribal organization enters into under this Act, unless expressly provided
in such law.
(ii) The laws listed in this paragraph are as follows:
(I) The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 471
et seq.).
(II) Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes.
(III) Section 9(c) of the Act of Aug. 2, 1946 (60 Stat. 809, chapter 744).
(IV) Title Ill of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949
(63 Stat. 393 et seq., chapter 288).
(V) Section 13 of the Act of Oct. 3, 1944 (58 Stat. 770; chapter 479).
(VI) Chapters 21, 25, 27, 29, and 31 of title 44, United States Code.
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struction contract" to "assure that the federal acquisition regulations are
not applied to contracts which do not involve classic construction ac-
tivities. ' ' 235 It then specifies a number of federal acquisition statutes and
regulations which will not apply even to construction contracts, including
Executive Order No. 11,246.236
The Contract Reform Act further evinces Congress' intent to preserve
the "unique legal status" of tribal employment. It has mandated that
employment involved in the administration of tribal programs and services
under self-determination contracts be free from governmental interference
through the executive order program. It makes no sense to differentiate
between employment under self-determination contracts and employment
involved in tribally owned businesses that hold other federal contracts;
in either case, the tribe is still the employer.
D. No Waiver of Immunity
Finally, the executive order program cannot be interpreted to waive
tribal sovereign immunity from government actions. The Executive has
no power to waive tribal sovereign immunity; only Congress can legislate
over tribal affairs. Nowhere in any legislation that can be deemed to
authorize Executive Order No. 11,246 does there appear any waiver-
express or otherwise-of tribal sovereign immunity from governmental
actions to enforce the Order. Under federal law, a waiver of tribal
sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed. ' 237 By exempting
tribes from its coverage, Title VII reinforces tribal sovereignty and sov-
ereign immunity. 238 Significantly, Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to
expressly cover state and local governments, thereby waiving their im-
munity from federal enforcement of Title VII; it did not do so for tribes.
Moreover, policy dictates that Congress' exclusion of tribes from an-
tidiscrimination actions cannot be deemed a protection that tribes can
waive by entering into a contract with the government or a prime gov-
ernment contractor. 23 9 As stated previously, most tribes are dependent
(VII) Section 2 of the Act of June 13, 1934 (48 Stat. 948, chapter 483).(VIII) Sections I through 12 of the Act of June 30, 1936 (49 Stat. 2036 et seq.
chapter 881).
(IX) The Service Control Act of 1965 (41 U.S.C. 351 et seq.).(X) The Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 631 et seq.).(XI) Executive Order Nos. 12,138, 11,246, 11,701 and 11,758.
235. S. Rep. No. 374, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1994).
236. See supra note 234.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.238. See Anderson, supra note 208, at 762 ("Title VII does not limit inherent tribal sovereignty,
but indicates an opposite congressional intent.") (citations omitted).239. A commentator makes the same point with respect to seniority systems protected by § 703(h)
of Title VII:
The argument that the OFCCP does not make any seniority system "unlawful" in
contravention of § 703(h), but rather merely adds a clause to government contracts,
which employers may voluntarily choose to accept or forego, fails for several reasons.
First, the OFCCP's own definitions make clear that it does indeed consider
seniority systems perpetuating discrimination to be illegal ....
Beyond the definitional considerations, it is clear that the OFCCP forces a great
Spring 1996]
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on federal funding; they have no alternative source of income. 240 Because
of tribes' dependency on federal funding for their survival, they must
enter into federal contracts and have little or no power to bargain over
the terms of the contracts. In that regard, federal contracts are akin to
adhesion contracts. 24' Thus, in order to avoid any possibility of having
to defend a discrimination action under Executive Order No. 11,246 (from
which they are otherwise immune by statute), tribes would be forced to
forego participation in federal contracts. The alternative is to incur
significant administrative costs to comply with the Order and to be
subjected to the possibility of incurring even greater costs in defending
agency actions to enforce compliance. Tribal treasuries can ill afford such
costs. The OFCCP's placement of tribes in such a position flouts con-
gressional policy promoting tribal self-determination and self-sufficiency.
Congress recognized the power of federal agencies to dictate terms of
contracts and create obstacles to the tribes' ability to govern themselves
when it amended the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act of 1975.242 It terminated these powers by enacting contractual language
for self-determination contracts and by stripping the Departments of
Interior and Health and Human Services of their ability to issue regulations
governing such contracts. 243 In subjecting tribes to the requirements of
and regulations under Executive Order No. 11,246, the OFCCP likewise
obstructs and thereby diminishes the tribes' ability to attain Congress'
stated goals of tribal self-determination and economic self-sufficiency.
V. AN APPROACH TO NONDISCRIMINATION UNDER
FEDERAL CONTRACTS THAT ACCOMMODATES TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY, FEDERAL INTERESTS, AND CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT
There is a way to accommodate the tribes' interest in maintaining
sovereignty and the federal government's interest in withholding taxpayers'
number of employers whose survival may often depend on government contracts
to abandon seniority systems that Teamsters and the legislative history of § 703(h)
indicate are protected ....
Finally, the guarantee of protection to bona fide seniority systems and their
recipients may be a right that cannot be waived in the consensual relationship
between parties to government contracts. Courts have routinely held that the benefits
Title VII extends to the victims of discrimination cannot be waived .... [Citations
omitted.] [Tihere is no obvious reason why the protections extended to seniority
recipients under § 703(h) should be treated differently. If those rights indeed cannot
be waived, then the OFCCP's policy of requiring that they be waived constitutes
an independent violation of § 703(h).
Long, supra note 62, at 1090 n.79 (emphasis added).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 160-67.
241. An "adhesion contract" is defined as a
[s]tandardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially
'take it or leave it' basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain
and under such conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired product or services
except by acquiescing in form contract. Distinctive feature of adhesion contract is
that weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).
242. 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 214-16.
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dollars from employers that discriminate. It is of course in a tribal
employer's interest to treat its employees fairly; by maintaining a strong
and loyal workforce, a tribal nation will enhance its sovereignty. In its
"government-to-government relationship" with tribes, however, the fed-
eral government must respect the tribes' ability to govern themselves and
manage their own affairs, which Congress and the federal courts have
acknowledged repeatedly.
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) 44 provides a means to
reconcile the tribal interest in autonomy and the federal interest in
nondiscrimination. Under the authority of the ICRA, the federal gov-
ernment can place antidiscrimination conditions on tribes' participation
in federal contracts that would accomplish its goal of preventing em-
ployment discrimination without infringing on tribal sovereignty and
thwarting congressional goals of self-determination and economic self-
sufficiency. The government can simply require, as a contract term, that
tribal contractors agree to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to
provide a forum and appropriate remedies for employees' or applicants'
complaints of unfair treatment under the due process and equal protection
provisions of the ICRA, which would cover employees' claims of unfair
treatment. 245 Many tribes provide such employee protections in their
laws.246 Under the ICRA, "due process" and "equal protection" are
defined by tribal law and custom. 247 Thus, tribes would be obligated as
employers under federal contracts to provide the same rights to their
employees that they are obligated to provide under the ICRA. An explicit
waiver to such effect in federal contracts would protect the government
from inability to enforce the provision under a sovereign immunity de-
fense.
Congress has already approved such an approach in the Contract
Reform Act. Its prescribed language for self-determination contracts spec-
ifies that tribal contractors agree to comply with the ICRA in administering
programs under the contract. 248 The same approach in all federal contracts
will accommodate federal and tribal interests and will further the United
States' government-to-government relationship with sovereign tribal nations.
244. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341.
245. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). For a discussion of tribal waivers of immunity under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, see Limas, supra note 125, at 380-82.
246. See, e.g., Limas, supra note 125, 382-83.
247. See Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, 783 F.2d
1409 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 (1986); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976).
See also Limas, supra note 125, at 383-84.
248. Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, § 108(c), 108 Stat. 4265 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 450(1) (1994)). The provision reads as follows:
(13) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF CONTRACTOR-Pursuant to the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (25 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.), the laws, policies, and
procedures of the Contractor shall provide for administrative due process (or the
equivalent of administrative due process) with respect to programs, services, func-
tions, and activities that are provided by the Contractor pursuant to this Contract.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Coverage of tribes and tribal employment by Executive Order No.
11,246 is an invalid exercise of executive authority because such coverage
is inconsistent with congressional intent expressed in various statutes,
federal policy toward tribal self-determination, self-sufficiency, and ec-
onomic development, and federal law pertaining to tribal sovereign nations.
As suggested above through the Indian Civil Rights Act, however,
federal contracts with Native American tribes can be administered in a
way that protects federal interests in nondiscrimination in federally funded
contracts as well as federal and tribal interests in tribal self-determination.
Such an approach is consistent with federal law and policy toward Native
American tribes and achieves federal goals of nondiscrimination.
